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ABSTRACT
Since the beginning of a new phase of governance in Egypt on the 3rd of July 2013,
there has been a remarkable trend of using punishment as a mechanism for repression
to control of the public realm in relation to protests, civil society organizations’ work,
and political opposition dissent, especially regarding Muslim Brotherhood
organization. This paper argues that such use of punishment though possibly successful
in the short run is likely to fail in the long run. Such failure is due to the lack of moral
and philosophical justifications of punishment, whether based on consequentialism or
retributivism theories of punishment. Further, such unjustified punishment decreases
the legitimacy of the Egyptian regime, thus increasing the likelihood of political
instability and dissent.
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I.

Introduction:

In a book assessing the Arab Spring series of revolutions, David McMurray and
Amanda Ufheil-Somers describe the use of law in the Mubarak era as a repression
mechanism to control dissent and political opposition as being one of the leading
reasons to the revolution:
The law was another tool of repression under Mubarak, used to
cudgel dissenting political voices and to institutionalize the power
of the executive branch. Civil society groups were heavily restricted
by laws controlling their funding and the nature of their operations.
Anti-terrorism laws gave cover to the regime’s attacks on Islamist
groups such as the Muslim Brothers. 1
The problem with this description of Mubarak’s era, is that it still equally applies to
Egypt now five years after the Revolution.
In the 25th of January Revolution, Egyptians ate, slept, and demonstrated in the
streets for 18 consecutive days demanding the fall of Mubarak’s regime. 2 Thirty years
of non-democratic governance, deterioration of public services, institutionalization of
corruption, high rates of inflation and unemployment finally triggered people’s public
anger. 3 They demanded freedom, social justice and democracy.
Five years on - 2016 - and worries remain about Egypt’s path towards
democracy. One of the main reasons behind these worries is the state’s use of
punishment as a mechanism of repression in dealing with perceived stability-related
issues. Whether such instability threats are seen as coming from the press, the youth
who participated in the revolution, political opposition groups, Muslim Brotherhood or
civil society organizations.
To clarify, when protests continued against the government following the
Revolution, the interim president Adly Mansour as acting legislator, issued the protests
law with severe punishment for those who demonstrated against the public order or
interfered with the course of justice. 4 Further, when the state wanted to eliminate the
existence of civil society organizations in Egypt, to avoid their monitoring of the status
1

McMurray, David, Ufheil-Somers, Amanda The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on
Militant Democracy in the Middle East 58, ( Indiana University Press, 2013)
2
See Hatem Maher, Wael Eskandar, Timeline: Egypt's year of revolution, ahramonline, 2015
3
Amin Galal, Egypt in the era of Hosni Mubarak (I.B.Tauris 2012)
4
Law 107/2013, Article 7, Aljaryda Al Rasmya, issue 47 bis, 24th Nov 2013

of freedom and democracy in Egypt, it amended article 78 of the penal code to
criminalize the receiving of foreign funds, arms or “any other thing” 5 for the purpose
of harming national interests, unity of the country or public peace. 6 The punishment for
this crime became lifetime imprisonment with the death sentence in certain cases.
Moreover, after the ouster of Muhammed Morsi and the subsequent sit-in in
Rabaa’ by Morsi supporters, which ended in mass casualties and deaths, 7 the state faced
the problem of the Muslim Brotherhood’s claims of Morsi’s legitimacy which threaten
the current governing authority. Accordingly, it declared the Muslim Brotherhood a
terrorist organization and issued the anti-terrorism law which included severe
punishment in the form of long sentences, lifetime imprisonment and the death penalty. 8
The more the Egyptian state is threatened with a loss of control, the more it
issues laws with severe levels of punishment in attempts to maintain control of the
social and political situation in Egypt. Such use of punishment triggers worries and
questions about how and why the Egyptian regime is using punishment as a means of
repression and control. Further, it incites asking whether this punishment is justified
and legitimate, and if not, what the effects are over the long run.
This paper claims that the Egyptian regime is using punishment as a repression
mechanism to maintain control of the public realm in the short run, however such use
of punishment will likely fail in the long run. This failure is due to the lack of moral
and philosophical justifications for punishment, whether in terms of achieving greater
good consequences such as deterrence and/or moral reform, or in terms of applying just
deserts and achieving justice. Further, the lack of justification renders punishment
illegitimate. Such illegitimacy is likely to result in an increase in dissent and potential
revolts against the government.
The paper is divided into two main parts. The first part is devoted to an analysis
of the political situation in Egypt as a way of establishing the context within which
punishment is being assessed, as well as an analysis of how the Egyptian regime uses
Egyptian Criminal Law, Second Book, First Section, article 78
Id.
7
See Menan Khater, 607 protesters died in Rabaa’ Al-Adaweya sit-in: Committee report, Daily News
Egypt, 2014, available at http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/11/26/607-protesters-died-rabaa-aladaweya-sit-committee-report/
8
Law 94/2015, First Part, Second Chapter, Aljaryda Al Rasmya, issue 33 bis, 15th Aug 2015
5
6
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punishment to control the public realm and the possible purposes it intends from this
use. The second part analyzes the two main schools of thought in the justification of
punishment, namely: consequentialism (especially deterrence and moral reform) and
retributivism, with the overall aim of proving that the Egyptian regime’s use of
punishment fails to satisfy these theories’ requirements for justification. Further, it
explores the illegitimate nature of unjustified punishment as a means of repression and
why it is likely to increase the possibility of dissent against the government.

3

II.

Democracy, Authoritarianism & Punishment

The Arab Spring revolutions generally and the Egyptian revolution specifically has
triggered a great number of scholarly writings to describe and analyze what happened,
how and why it happened as well as to speculate on the future outcomes of these
massive political movements. Five years after the Egyptian revolution, I believe it is an
appropriate time to analyze what has transpired since the events of January 2011.
Is Egypt moving on the way towards achieving democracy? Or is it moving
back towards an even more autocratic form of governance than under Mubarak? What
is the role that punishment plays in this context? And how does it affect the manner in
which Egyptians are governed? Answers to these questions are analyzed in the two
upcoming sections.

A. Egypt Path Towards Democracy
It is indeed too soon to answer whether Egypt have achieved democracy yet or not. The
development of such a model of governance, requires years of building strong
institutions, political participation, transparency, accountability and trust between the
government and the people. However, it is not too early to examine whether there is a
movement towards building a democratic foundation versus drifting towards reviving
an old dictatorship.
This analysis focuses on the period after the 30 June 2013 protests following the
ouster of Morsi for two reasons. First, the first two years post the revolution do not
provide a stable enough political governing authority to judge, as this time was filled
with struggles concerning the shape of the state, the constitution, the formation of
parties, of parliament and the contributions of the young generation in governance. It
also witnessed the ouster of the first elected president as a result of his attempts to
monopolize state powers for the sake of Muslim Brotherhood interests. 9

See Brian Dunlap, What were the primary reasons that the Egyptian military removed Morsi from the
Presidency?, Quora, ( Aug 2013) available at https://www.quora.com/What-were-the-primaryreasons-that-the-Egyptian-military-removed-Morsi-from-the-Presidency and, Mark Gollom,
9

Analysis: How Dictatorial is Egypt’s Morsi, CBC News, (Nov 2012) available at
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/how-dictatorial-is-egypt-s-morsi-1.1181795
4

Secondly, the 30 June protests marked a moment of renewing people’s faith in
their ability to change the governing authority and to fight threats of authoritarianism.
This is seen in the mass number of protesters and the diversity of those participating. It
also witnessed the introduction of a new road map towards democracy as announced
by El-Sisi with support from several parties and public figures. 10
Accordingly, in order to analyze whether Egypt is moving towards democracy,
it is indeed important to first settle what is meant by democracy as the term’s meaning
is highly contested in the literature.
The common understanding usually associated with democracy is its being a
form of governance that includes the exercise of the power of the people through a
system of representation as illustrated in periodic free elections. 11 However, this
common meaning is in fact subject to disagreement among scholars. Rather, what most
of them do agree on is that democracy is a contested concept by nature, and that it
cannot be applied on all nations in the same form. 12
In fact, according to Bernard, democracy can never mean the same to all; it is a
concept that reflects, in every definition, the different social, moral and political
agendas of each culture and nation. 13 Whitehead as well agrees recognizing that the
concept of democracy resists the idea of a universally applicable definition as “all
worthwhile conceptions of democracy must incorporate a cognitive capacity to
challenge reigning orthodoxies.” 14 Accordingly, what she concludes is that what we
can agree on is that democracy has some indispensable elements without which the
concept would be vacuous, for example; accountability, citizenship and deliberation.
However, what these elements mean should be left open to a range of various

Alaa al-Aswany, Morsi's Ouster a Triumph for Democracy, Al-Monitor, (July 2013), available at
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/07/alaa-aswany-morsi-overthrow-threat-mubarakregime.html
11
Payne, James L., Making the World Safe for Muddle: The Meaning of Democracy in American
Foreign Policy, 13 Independent Review 601, 604 (2009)
12
See Crick, Bernard, Democracy : A Very Short Introduction 1, (Oxford University
Press, 2002), and Laurence Whitehead, The vexed issue of the meaning of ‘democracy’, 2 Journal of
Political ideologies 121, 130 (1997) (2007)
13
Crick, Bernard, Democracy : A Very Short Introduction 1, (Oxford University
Press, 2002)
14
Laurence Whitehead, The vexed issue of the meaning of ‘democracy’, 2 Journal of Political
ideologies 121, 130 (1997) (2007)
10
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configurations determined according to the particular cultural, historical and customary
conditions. 15
Then, if democracy has no definite meaning and is subject to each culture’s
conception and history, how to use such a flexible concept to judge Egypt’s political
governance? The answer lies in going back to the Egyptian history and circumstances,
to the revolution itself.
During the revolution, what people demanded by endangering their lives in the
streets for 18 consecutive days shouting for Mubarak’s regime to fall, was regaining
their ability to change the governing authority and the rules and way of governance. An
ability that has been lost for the prior thirty years under Mubarak. 16
In fact, the threat of losing this ability for another thirty years was one of the
triggers of the revolution as the last years before the revolution witnessed the promoting
of Gamal Mubarak as a successor to his father, thus denying Egyptians' ability to choose
a president. 17
Further, the 2010 parliament was a clear illustration of corruption and fraud,
hindering people’s ability to choose their representatives. It was reported that the 2010
elections witnessed “breathtaking” 18 levels of fraud whereby organized violence was
used by the government to ensure complete control of the elections and complete
exclusion of the opposition which resulted in over 80% of the seats going to the NDP,
the ruling party. 19
Thus, when we compare this basic and essential demand with the literature on
democracy we find that one of the first essential components agreed upon by many

Id. at 126-130
Galal A. Amin, Whatever Happened to the Egyptian Revolution?, 137(Oxford
University Press, 2013)
17
See Jason Brownlee, The Heir Apparency of Gamal Mubarak, 15/16 The Arab Stud. J. 36, 4651(2007-2008) for a description of the climbing process of Gamal Mubarak to running the NDP and his
preparation for succession to his father in presidency.
18
Egypt's rulers tighten grip amid claims of election fraud and intimidation, The Guardian (Nov. 2010),
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/egypt-poll-electoral-fraud-claims
19
Id. and Egypt election: Hosni Mubarak's NDP sweeps second round, BBC News Middle East (Dec.
2010), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11935368
15
16
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scholars concerning the outline of what democracy means is people’s ability to effect
change in the public realm.
According to Ober, the original meaning of democracy in the Greek language
is the capacity of the people to do things and that:
'the empowered demos' – it is the regime in which the demos gains
a collective capacity to effect change in the public realm. And so it
is not just a matter of control of a public realm but the collective
strength and ability to act within that realm and, indeed, to
reconstitute the public realm through action. 20
Further, according to Dahrendorf, democracy is a concept that gives legitimacy
to the exercise of political power through providing answers to three main questions.
The first of which is how people can achieve change in their society without violence. 21
In his words, “the simplest definition of democracy has been given by Karl Popper: a
system that makes it possible to get rid of a government without spilling blood.” 22
Accordingly, as Egyptians revolted on the 25th of January 2011 to regain their
ability to effect change under Mubarak and then revolted again on the 30 of June 2013
to regain it one more time from Morsi after he issued the constitutional declaration that
gave him absolute powers and granted him immunity from judicial bodies. 23 Do
Egyptians then still have the ability to effect change? The following two sub-sections
explore this ability between law and reality.
1. Egyptians' Ability To Effect Change according to the Egyptian
Constitution
Generally speaking, people’s ability to effect change in the public realm reflects two
main things: people’s ability to choose and change those who govern them, and
people’s ability to choose and change the rules by which they are governed.
Accordingly, for Egyptians to have an ability to choose and change those who
govern them, they have to have the freedom to choose and change the president and the
government. On the other hand, in order to have an ability to choose and change the
Josiah Ober, The Original Meaning of Democracy: Capacity To Do Things, not Majority Rule, 15
Constellations 3, 7 (2008)
21
Ralf Dahrendorf, A Definition of Democracy, 14 Journal of Democracy 103, 103 (2003)
22
Id.
23
Supra note 13
20
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rules by which they are governed, they must have the freedom to choose parliamentary
members as a direct way to changing of the rules. They must also have access to indirect
ways of affecting government policies through freedom to criticize and object. Such
objection may be demonstrated through freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom to protest, freedom to form political parties and to contribute in political life,
as well as freedom to form civil society organizations.
In fact, all these freedoms are granted in the Egyptian Constitution. The first
article provides that Egypt is a democratic republic. 24 On the one hand, it assures
people’s right to elect a president every four years and to elect the members of the
parliament who, in their turn, take the responsibility of legislating the rules of law,
monitoring the government policies and holding it accountable to people. 25
On the other hand, the constitution grants freedom of speech, freedom of the
press, freedom of public meetings and protests, freedom of establishing civil society
organizations and their ability to perform their activities freely, freedom to establish
political parties and to participate in public and political life. 26
However, apart from what the constitution states on paper, by analyzing the
factual circumstances of Egypt, we find that these aspects are far from being realized
on the ground.
2. Egyptians' Ability To Effect Change In Reality
Starting from Egyptians' ability to choose and change the president. The ability to
choose the president was highly affected by the strong media advocacy for El-Sisi as
the only reasonable choice for presidency. After El-Sisi announcement of candidacy
for president, 27 all media outlets were directed to promoting El-Sisi as the definite next
president as El-Meshad provides:
If there was any doubt about who the presidential frontrunner would
be in Egypt's May 2014 elections, the Egyptian media made sure to

Article 1, Egyptian Constitution for 2014, Aljaryda Al Rasmya, issue 3 bis (a) , 18th Jan 2014
Id. at articles 101, 125, 129-135, 140
26
Id. at 65, 67, 70-75
27
Dina Ezzat, Al-Sisi announces his candidacy, Al-Ahram Weekly (March 2014), available at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/5817/17/Al-Sisi-announces-his-candidacy.aspx
24
25
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strongly suggest that then-Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
was the only choice. 28
In this regard, even if the media’s advocacy for El-Sisi and the low than
expected turnout of the elections -that was a result of the young generation boycottwere overlooked. The important question is whether Egyptians still have the ability to
choose a president other than El-Sisi? More importantly in terms of assessing the path
towards democracy, whether Egyptians still have the ability to choose their president
from outside the military institution?
Unfortunately, reality and political science answer both questions negatively.
The Egyptians ability to change El-Sisi as a person or as a model of governance is
highly doubtful for two reasons. The first one relates to the fact that the Egyptian
military will not abandon voluntarily the role it plays in Egypt as a main player and
influencer in the politics that it had acquired for over 60 years. 29 They want to maintain
their privileges and superior status which cannot be ensured or maintained under the
governance of a civilian president independent from the military. 30 Accordingly, they
have the force and the control to impede the development of any political alternative to
military candidates without any equivalent opposing political force that can stop their
projects.
The second reason relates to the severe restrictions of civil and political
freedoms in Egypt now; objection to or criticisms of the El-Sisi is now associated with
the threat of legal punishment. 31 Such threats kill opportunities for the development of
political life, as does the close monitoring of political parties by security institutions
and tying their ability to contribute in political life to their commitment not to cross the

Mohamed Elmeshad, We Completely Agree: Egyptian Television Media in the Era of Al-Sisi,
Jadaliyya, (2015) available at http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/21305/we-completelyagree_egyptian-television-media-in-t
29
Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule 199 -202, (Cambridge
University Press, 2012)
30
For more information on the role of military in non-democratic governance, See Milan W.
Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule 123-138, (Cambridge University Press, 2012)
and Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government & Politics
119-124 (MACMILIAN PRESS LTD, 2000)
31
Sherif Mansour, Stifling The Public Sphere: Media and Civil Society In Egypt, National Endowment
for Democracy – International Forum for Democratic Studies, 2-3, available at
http://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Stifling-the-Public-Sphere-Media-Civil-SocietyEgypt-Forum-NED.pdf
28
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lines of criticism against the president. 32 These circumstances will effectively kill the
development of any civilian alternative to El-Sisi.
Moreover, not only has the current Egyptian regime impacted the Egyptians'
ability to change those who govern them, rather, it has, as well, decided to control the
choice and the change of the rules of governance to ensure having complete political
control.
According to reports and testimonies from current members of the parliament,
the selection of the members of the parliament was achieved through close monitoring
and careful choosing by the general and military secret service to ensure that whomever
participates in the election process would be loyal to the president. 33 Several political
parties were forced to join the ally formed by hidden security forces in the form of an
electoral list to avoid security harassments of their individual candidates. 34
Such testimonies shed doubt on the integrity of the recent parliamentary
elections. This means that the governing authority manipulated the ability of the people
to choose their representatives by pushing them towards a limited choice of already
agreed upon candidates who would not pose trouble to the governing authority. Thus,
they limited people’s ability to effect change to the rules of governance and to
effectively monitor the work of the president and the government.
As to the indirect ways of affecting the executive policies through controlling
freedoms of speech, press, protests and civil society organizations, they are all
eliminated through the mechanism of punishment.
The punishment mechanism is regularly used by the Egyptian regime to
eliminate all forms of possible objections in two ways. The first one is the issuance of
new amendments into the penal code and the issuance of new laws with ambiguous and
broad criminalization sphere and severe punishments. These laws were issued by the
presidents – Adly Mansour and El-Sisi- as acting legislators before the formation of
the parliament. The second is the revival of the already existing crimes against the
government which were rarely used since their enactment in the penal code.
Hossam Bahgat, How El Sisi Elected His Parliament, Mada Masr, (March 2016)
Id.
34
Id.
32
33
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The amended crimes include article 78 about receiving foreign fund that was
amended in scope and in punishment to criminalize receiving funds, or “any other
thing” 35 from any local or foreign person or organization for the purpose of harming
the national interest, unity of the country or public peace. 36 And punishment was
lengthened to lifetime imprisonment, which can extend to the death penalty in certain
cases. The new laws included the issuance of the protests law which bans protests if
they would “disturb the security, the public order … or affect the course of justice” 37
among other things. And whoever violates this ban or receives any benefits to organize
demonstrations against this ban will be punished by imprisonment between 2 to 15
years.
The revived crimes from the penal code include acts threatening the national
unity, public order, social peace, as well as acts demanding or advocating for the
suspension of the constitution, or the change of the social or economic structures of the
state. These acts are punishable whether promoted through writing or verbally, and are
punishable by sentences up to life time imprisonment or the death penalty in certain
circumstances. 38
The effects of using punishment as a threat to whoever opposes the president or
criticizes him, is that first, it created a self-censorship by the Egyptian media to avoid
direct criticism as much as possible. 39 Second, with the increased threats of ongoing
cases against many public figures, for any sort of criticism, including drawing
caricature that is sarcastic about the president’s speech, 40 the sphere of freedom of
speech and press is narrowed to a great extent.
Further, the remaining civil society organizations are subject to continuous
security harassments. Some have been closed or under the threat of closure, and some,

Supra note 3 article 78
Id.
37
Article 7, Aljaryda Al Rasmya, issue 47 bis, 24th Nov 2013
38
Egyptian Criminal Law, Second Book, First Section, articles 77(d), 78, 80 (d) & Second Section,
articles 86, 89, 102 bis
39
Supra note 27
40
Cartoonist Islam Gawish arrested for anti-gov’t comics, Mada Masr (Jan 2016), available at
http://www.madamasr.com/news/cartoonist-islam-gawish-arrested-anti-govt-comics
35
36
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their heads and activists have been accused of crimes from the type of disturbing
national peace and the country’s stability. 41
According to the above analysis, even if it is too soon to judge whether Egypt
achieved democracy or not, we can conclude with confidence that this way, the
Egyptian regime is not building democratic foundations to strengthen Egyptians' path
towards democracy. Rather, this is more of a throwback to the rules of politics under
Mubarak’s regime.
However, does drifting away from the road towards democracy mean by default
that Egypt is being governed by an authoritarian regime? If so, what is the role that
punishment plays in this context? How punishment has been used by the Egyptian
regime in the political arena? Answers to these questions are provided in the next
section.

B. Authoritarianism & Punishment
The analysis of the current Egyptian regime and its mode of governance provided in
the previous section raises questions about whether Egypt is now not only drifting away
from democracy, but rather, whether it is in fact being governed by an authoritarian
regime.
According to political scientists, the answer to such a question is decidedly
positive. Those who wrote about authoritarianism provide that authoritarian regimes or
dictatorships are both synonyms for non-democratic regimes, which are regimes that
lack the essentials of democratic governance. 42
In a more detailed view, Svolik defines authoritarian rule as the one lacking at
least one of the essential features of a democracy, namely, free and competitive
See From Restriction to Closure of Public Space in Egypt: Egyptian Government Clamps Down on
Rights Groups, Seeking Their Eradication, The Egyptian center for Public Policy Studies, available at
http://ecpps.org/index.php/en/news/95-press-releases/663-from-restriction-to-closure-of-publicspace-in-egypt and Egypt Orders Closure of Leading NGO Nadeem Center for ‘Violations’, Egyptians
Streets (Feb 2016), available at http://egyptianstreets.com/2016/02/17/egypt-orders-closure-ofleading-ngo-nadeem-center-for-violations/
42
Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule 20 (Cambridge University
Press, 2012), Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships:
Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their leaders 2 (The Continuum
International Publishing Group, 2011) and, Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes:
Theory, Government & Politics 2 (MACMILIAN PRESS LTD, 2000)
41
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legislative elections, and free and competitive executive elections. 43 Others provide a
straight forward definition by stating that “dictatorships are not democracies,” 44 where
democracies are defined as the one where people choose those who govern them
through “contested elections.” 45
In the same line, authoritarian regimes are defined with reference to two criteria,
“a situation where (a) freedom is restricted in favour of obedience to authority, and (b)
this authority is itself exercised with few restrictions.” 46
Accordingly, based on the previous overview and analysis of the Egyptian
situation, we find that all of these definitions, in fact, apply to Egypt. The integrity and
contestability of the presidential elections cannot be established when the winner of the
elections is known ahead of the election itself. In this regard, Svolik provides that “in
many dictatorships with elections, who is going to win is a forgone conclusion.” 47
The Egyptian legislative elections were restricted to the candidates who
satisfied the loyalty test of the security officers before being allowed to compete for the
parliamentary seats. 48 Freedoms are restricted now more than ever with continuous
claims from the regime supporters that those who object to the governing authority are
traitors to the national interests of the country. 49 The authority is also exercised with
minimum restrictions as the president holds all of the executive powers in his hands, as
well as the legislative ones are pre-ordained to obey and not to object.
The remarkable and noteworthy feature that appeared in this analysis of the
Egyptian situation is how punishment has been used as a tool to create this context. The
application of punishment and the fear of punishment have been used to shape the
environment of civil and political freedoms in Egypt. Moreover, it has been used to

Milan W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule 22 (Cambridge University
Press, 2012)
44
Natasha Ezrow and Erica Frantz, Dictators and Dictatorships:
Understanding Authoritarian Regimes and their leaders 2 (The Continuum
International Publishing Group, 2011)
45
Id.
46
Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government & Politics 22
(MACMILIAN PRESS LTD, 2000)
47
Supra note 41 at 23
48
Supra note 31
49
Hania Sobhy, Secular Façade, Neoliberal Islamisation,Textbook Nationalism from Mubarak to SiSi,
21 Nations and Nationalism 805, 805 (2015)
43

13

control emerging political opposition to the regime and to guarantee the regime’s
survival.
The questions to be asked then is how the Egyptian regime adapted punishment
to control the public realm and why? Further, what are the purposes that the Egyptian
regime is intending to realize from such use of punishment, whether in the short run or
in the long run? The following two sections explore the answers for these important
questions.
1. Use of Punishment to Control the Public Realm
Svolik, in his book about the politics of authoritarian rule, claims that every dictatorship
faces two main problems; the first one is the problem of authoritarian power-sharing
which concerns how the ruler divides power with the surrounding elites while at the
same time avoiding their threats. 50 The second which concerns the focus of this
research, is the problem of authoritarian control, 51 or what I call the problem of
controlling the public realm.
For every ruler who decides to gather all powers in his hands and to work on
the survival of his regime without the willingness to share such power or rotate it
through contested elections -as in democracies- will face ‘the original sin’ of every
dictatorship, which is “[t]he lack of popular consent – inherent in any political system
where a few govern over the many.” 52
Such lack of consent is dealt with in one of two ways: repression or cooptation. 53 Either the regime provides positive incentives, usually economic ones, to
raise public support for the regime, or it relies on repressing those who oppose its
ruling. 54 And in some regimes, a mix of both means is applied to ensure control.
Repression is commonly handled through directing force towards the threats of
the regime by the soldiers of the police and the internal security institutions. When the
threats escalate to the level of potential mass led organized opposition, the military
Supra note 41 at 5-8
Id. at 9-13
52
Id. at 10
53
Id.
54
Id. ( For more details on repression and co-optation as means of authoritarian control, See Ch. 5 &
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50
51

14

intervenes as the crucial force capable of saving the situation. 55 However, in the
Egyptian context, I argue that the mechanism of punishment was used as a tool of
repression to control the public realm, instead of reliance on military intervention or a
clear resort to force.
In fact, the 25 January Revolution and the 30 June mass protests created a
dilemma for the Egyptian governing authority. Egyptians still remember how in the
near past they were able to effect change in the public realm, to change those who
govern and to affect the rules of governance. Accordingly, the use of blatant force is
no longer an option as it carries with it a high risk of re-triggering people’s anger into
revolting against the government.
Thus, the Egyptian regime had to find an alternative tool to control the political
situation and the fluidity of the public realm, and it found such a suitable alternative in
punishment.
To clarify further, post the 30 June mass protests, three main problems faced
the Egyptian regime. The first one was the young generation who contributed to the
Revolution whose main tool for effecting change was protests, demonstrations, and
their use of media and press tools. The second problem was civil society organizations
and their pressure on the government in monitoring the status of democratic transition,
civil and political freedoms and the commitment of the Egyptian government to the
respect of basic human rights. The third problem was opposition by other political
forces, most notably Muslim Brotherhood members who challenged the legitimacy of
the new regime post Morsi.
For each of these problems, punishment provided a solution. The first one is the
problem of protests. Protestors were consistently attacked in the media as
troublemakers and impediments to the stability of the country. 56 Under the claim of
maintaining stability and promoting economic growth and against all civil society and
Egyptian youth objections, law 107/2013 was issued to allegedly regulate protests. The
law bans protests if they would “disturb the security, the public order … or affect the
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course of justice” 57 among other things, and punishes those who violate such a ban with
imprisonment of up to 15 years. The law effectively hollowed out the protest right of
any meaning and gave the authority the legitimacy to ban any and all protests under
wide sphere of criminalization and through an effective punishment tool.
Not only does the regime punish those who protest, but it has revived as well
the crimes included in the penal code concerning acts threatening the security of the
government from the inside. As detailed in the previous section, this has led to severe
restrictions that downsized the sphere of public opposition through the media and the
internet.
The punishment of these crimes has not only helped the Egyptian regime to get
rid of its first problem of young troublemakers, but it has worked as well equally against
the second problem of the civil society organizations.
In fact, the threats of punishment against civil society organizations work are
highlighted in a joint press release by several civil society organizations, where they
advanced that “… human rights defenders were threatened with prison sentences and
at times death, leading several of the most prominent defenders to leave the country
and prompting other groups to downsize their operations.” 58 As well, “the
investigations into the receipt of foreign funding were reopened with the goal of
eliminating remaining civil society organizations.” 59
The last and third problem concerns opposing political parties generally and
Muslim brotherhood specifically. Opposition parties generally were not the bigger
problem due to the weakness of the old parties as inherited from Mubarak’s time and
the youthful nature of the new parties which undermine their political strength.
Accordingly, controlling these parties fell under the umbrella of punishment provided
in the crimes against the government already included in the penal code. Accusations
of working against the national interests were ready to face any potential threat.

Article 7, Aljaryda Al Rasmya, issue 47 bis, 24th Nov 2013
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The bigger problem then was the Muslim Brotherhood members, who publicly
challenge the new regime’s legitimacy, and threaten to perform violent attacks on the
state if Morsi did not return as a president. For that, the regime declared the Muslim
Brotherhood a terrorist organization and issued the anti-terrorism law whereby the
average punishment ranges between life-time imprisonment and the death penalty.
Accordingly, punishment provided an answer for each instability problem
facing the regime. But, why the regime chose punishment specifically as a tool? What
are the benefits that punishment brings?
2. Intended Purposes from the Use of Punishment
In fact, the choice of punishment as a repression mechanism to control the
fluidity of the public realm and the possible objections that may face the government
served several purposes that direct repression or use of force would not have normally
achieved.
First, it gave the regime the legitimacy of the legal rule. Such appearance of
legitimacy grants the regime –in the eyes of the masses - the role of the protector of the
rule of law and negates its linkage to the imprisonment of government opponents who
get locked away by law. This legitimacy consequently ensures alleged stability of the
country and possible obedience of the people.
Moreover, the punishment mechanism avoids the anger of the people triggered
by the more direct form of repression as represented in the use of force. As well as it
enters the opponents – who are subject to punishment – into a long legal process that
keeps them away from a direct struggle against the government, which further weakens
their position in the eyes of the masses who tend to believe that these are criminals
accused of crimes against the country rather than to believe that they are members of
the political opposition.
These benefits logically justify the Egyptian regime choice of the mechanism
of punishment to repress its opponents and to control the public realm in the short run.
But the question that must be asked now, is what the Egyptian regime is intending to
gain in the long run from using punishment. What is the aim or purpose that the regime
believes punishment will achieve?
17

I believe assuming that the current Egyptian regime is pure evil is kind of naïve.
Sometimes nationalism or patriotic reasons may drive dictatorial behavior, especially
in regimes with a military background, where militants usually question civilian
politicians and believe that they are not qualified to rule nor do they understand the
risks of ruling. 60
Accordingly, there must be a farther purpose or goal the Egyptian regime aims
punishment will achieve in the long run. By returning to the famous quote, “when you
have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the
truth." 61
The truth then lies in exploring the different logical scenarios of possible
purposes. These scenarios can be summarized in two main trends. Either the Egyptian
regime hopes to achieve one of the aims that justify the use of punishment as analyzed
by punishment philosophers, or the regime is just seeing punishment as a means to
effective political control and stability. The following chapter will examine these
scenarios with an aim to prove that both outcomes are likely to fail.
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III.

The Egyptian Regime’s Philosophy of Punishment

This chapter addresses the possible two scenarios that the Egyptian regime may be
aiming for in adopting punishment in the long run, and why both scenarios are likely
to fail.
The first possible scenario that explains why the Egyptian regime uses
punishment is that it is trying to achieve one of the aims that justify the use of
punishment as analyzed by punishment philosophers. In this regard, punishment
philosophers generally revolve around one of two main philosophies in justifying
punishment. The first one is that punishment is evil, however we inflict it only because
it achieves good consequences, such as deterrence of the criminal and other potential
criminals or reform of the criminal him/herself. 62 The second is that punishment is an
end in itself; it is inflicted because every criminal should get what they deserve, and
this is what justice requires. 63
On the other hand, the second possible scenario behind the Egyptian regime’s
use of punishment is that it believes punishment will secure political control and
stability, thus ensuring the regime will endure and giving it a chance to execute social
and economic development plans.
Accordingly, this chapter will be divided into three main sections; the first one
is devoted to consequentialists' theories, especially deterrence and moral reform. The
second addresses retributivism, and the third is about political control and stability.
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A. Consequentialism
Consequentialists believe that punishment is justified only to the extent that it produces
good consequences. Accordingly, the only acceptable justification for them for
inflicting punishment is that it leads to a greater good, whether for the society or for
the criminal him/herself. 64 As R. A. Duff explains the nature of consequentialism:
Consequentialists hold that the justification of any action, policy or
practice depends solely on its expected overall consequences: It is
right if its consequences are good … and wrong when its
consequences are bad. 65
Such a philosophy is closely connected to the work of Jeremy Bentham on
utilitarianism, 66 where he provided that all human actions are under the sovereign of
two masters: pain and pleasure. 67 Accordingly, every person is seeking to maximize
pleasure and to minimize pain, and as this principle governs every action, then
according to Bentham it includes governing every government action as well. 68 Thus,
the government should seek to maximize the overall happiness of the society and to
minimize its pain.
On application on punishment, Bentham provides that as punishment is pain
and evil in itself, thus the government is originally obliged to refrain from it as much
as possible under the utility principle. As such, the only situation where the government
is justified in inflicting punishment is only if punishment augments of the overall
happiness of the society. 69
Accordingly, consequentialists and utilitarians both agree that punishment is
justified only in so far as it promotes good consequences in general. Utilitarians differ
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in specifying that the good consequences should be specifically the augment of the
overall happiness of the greatest number of people in the society. 70
However, in order to realistically assess whether the Egyptian regime's
philosophy of punishment is aimed at using punishment only if it produces good
consequences and refrains from it if it produces bad consequences, we need first to
settle what are the good consequences intended here.
According to consequentialists generally, the prevention of the crime is the
most central good that can be served by a system of punishment. 71 In this regard, some
theorists advance that the prevention goal is better achieved through specific and/or
general deterrence. While others provide that such prevention is better achieved by
reforming the criminal into acknowledging his/her wrongdoing and refraining from
returning to it on moral grounds.
In this regard, utilitarians agree with consequentialists on the general aim of
punishment. Bentham proposes that preventing the criminal from harming the society
again and setting him as an example for others is likely to have a positive impact on
augmenting the total happiness of the society. 72
Accordingly, there are two possible good consequences to assess, deterrence
and moral reform. The following sub sections will analyze deterrence and moral reform
theories, and whether or not the theories' requirements apply on the Egyptian regime
use of punishment. More specifically, whether the Egyptian regime can justify its use
of punishment against protesters, civil society organizations members and Muslim
Brotherhood members by reference to the consequentialists' school of thought.
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1. Deterrence Theory:
Deterrence in its simplest form means that punishment should work as a threat that will
prevent criminals from committing more crimes and dissuade others from becoming
criminals out of fear of punishment. 73 This simple form has been interpreted in different
yet related ways by philosophers.
Bentham contended that deterrence is setting “an example” 74 of the criminal by
punishing him so others would fear committing the crime; and this is how punishment
helps in increasing the overall happiness of the society through preventing future
crimes. At the same time, he specified four constraints on the application of punishment
as a deterrent threat, in which instances, punishment will not achieve deterrence.
Bentham provided that punishment would not set an example and would in fact increase
pain and minimize happiness if it was ““groundless,” “inefficacious,” “unprofitable,”
or “needless.”” 75
In this regard, punishment is groundless “where there is no mischief for it to
prevent.” 76 As punishment is evil in itself and should not be inflicted unless to prevent
a greater evil, then if the act to be punished does not qualify in the first place as evil,
then punishment is groundless.
Secondly, punishment is inefficacious “where it cannot act so as to prevent the
mischief.” 77 This constraint presupposes that for the crime to be prevented there must
be a rational calculation in which the pain of the punishment prevails over the pleasure
of the crime. Accordingly, punishment would be inefficacious if such calculation has
not occurred in the first place or if it was conducted by the criminal and the pain of the
punishment did not prevail.
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To clarify, the calculation cannot happen at all when “the penal provision is not
established until after the act is done,” 78 or the provision is not brought to the
knowledge of the public, or the criminal is suffering from insanity or he is an infant for
example, thus in all these instances the rational calculation is not possible in the first
place. On the other hand, punishment may be inefficacious if the pain of the punishment
does not prevail in the calculation. When, for instance, the crime is committed to avoid
an evil that is much greater than the evil produced by the punishment. 79 For example,
a person who is threatened with torture unless he reveals the secrets of his country, thus
committing an act of treason if he does so; his rational calculation at such a moment
will not probably weigh the pain of the expected punishment to be greater than the pain
of torture and “[n]either he, nor any possible future criminals in the same position,
could possibly be deterred by the fear of punishment.” 80
Thirdly, punishment is unprofitable “where the mischief it would produce
would be greater than what it prevented.” 81 As Bentham contends that punishment
institutions’ primary goal should always be augmenting the overall happiness and
minimizing the pain, thus if punishment causes more suffering than happiness, then it
would be unprofitable to apply it as per the utility principle.
In this regard, he states that one of the instances in which punishment produces
greater evil than what it prevents is when it causes “[t]he displeasure of the people; that
is, of an indefinite number of the members of the same community, in cases where …
they happen to conceive, that the offense or the offender ought not to be punished at
all, or at least ought not to be punished in the way in question.” 82 For example, when a
great percentage of the community agrees that the criminalized actions should not be
an offense at all. This is what happened in Egypt concerning the crime of offending the
president of the country, where a great percentage of the community called for the
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abolishment of the crime in demand of the freedom to criticize the president without
fear of punishment. 83
Finally, the fourth constraint is that punishment should not be needless.
Punishment is needless when the alleged crime could be treated without punishment.
That is, when there are less costly means than punishment -in terms of producing painthat could prevent the crime. In this regard, Bentham uses the example of the
punishment of a man who promotes harmful ideas, 84 he says “the pen is the proper
weapon to combat error with, not the sword.” 85
As for consequentialists, their main idea about deterrence is based on the
assumption that individuals are rational creatures who are self-interested and who are
capable of weighing the costs and benefits of each decision they make. 86 And as each
individual is looking to maximize his benefits while bearing the least costs, then for a
rational human who is assessing whether or not to commit a crime, the costs of
committing the crime should be higher than the benefit of committing it. 87
Thus, punishment achieves deterrence only if the pain of the punishment
exceeds the benefit of the crime. This idea is closely related to the second constraint
suggested by Bentham concerning inefficaciousness. Bentham suggests that
punishment will not achieve deterrence if in the rational calculation between the
pleasure of the crime and the pain of punishment, the pain of punishment does not
prevail.
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Accordingly, regarding the Egyptian regime's philosophy of punishment, let’s
assume that the regime is trying to achieve deterrence in the long run as one possible
logical answer for why they employ punishment as clarified in the first chapter.
In this regard, to prove that deterrence will fail as a first justification for the
Egyptian regime as claimed by this paper. I need to prove that either the pain of the
punishment adopted does not exceed the benefit of the crime or that the punishment
fails to satisfy one or more of Bentham’s constraints or both.
2. Application of Deterrence Philosophy on the Egyptian Regime
As highlighted in the first chapter, the Egyptian regime post the 30 June protests faced
three main problems: the youth protests, the civil society organizations, and the
political opposition, or mainly the Muslim brotherhood members challenge to the
legitimacy of the regime. Accordingly, the regime is trying to deter young people from
engaging in protests and demonstrations; they are trying to deter civil society
organizations from issuing reports that may embarrass the government – thus
essentially restricting their work-, and they are trying to deter the Muslim Brotherhood
members from criticizing and challenging the regime’s legitimacy.
Apparently, in the short run, the regime seems to have succeeded in decreasing
protests to a great extent. One after the other, civil society organizations remain under
the threat of closure by administrative decisions and its members and leaders are
prosecuted under a long list of accusations, 88 and the Muslim Brotherhood problem is
contained to a great extent by locking many of its leaders and a great percentage of its
members up in prison.
The important questions to ask, however, are whether such deterrence is
genuine, or is it just a calm surface that hides the storm beneath it? Will deterrence
sustains to work as a justification for punishment in the long run? Let’s consider each
problem and see whether the pain of the punishment will continue to work as a credible
threat that outweighs the benefit of the crime and whether Bentham’s constraints apply
in the case of the Egyptian regime or not.
Background on Case No. 173 - the “foreign funding case”: Imminent Risk of Prosecution and Closure,
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (March 2016), available at
http://www.cihrs.org/?p=18362&lang=en
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Regarding the first problem of protesting; in order to assess the calculation of
the pain of the punishment versus the benefit of the crime, there is a need first to settle
what the crime is and the nature of the benefit that the offender aims to achieve.
Article 7 of the protest law bans protesters from “disturbing security, public
order, obstructing production or calling for it … or affecting the course of justice” 89
among other things, and articles 18 and 19 punish whomever violates article 7 with
imprisonment of between two to 15 years. 90
In Article 7, what is meant by public order or the course of justice is ambiguous
as neither the law nor the criminal courts judgments provide any definition for what is
meant by these terms. This means that the regime has great discretion in tailoring them
to any protest objecting the regime. Thus, the threat of punishment can be fairly said to
be directed towards any person who protests against the regime. Accordingly, as the
criminalization sphere includes any possible protest against the regime, then what is
the benefit that those who break the law and protest aim to gain?
Protests are collective actions signaling citizens’ dissatisfaction with the
government or the regime. 91 It aims to challenge the policies and actions of the
government and to demand political change, 92 whether in terms of complete regime
change or in terms of government or policy changes. Accordingly, the benefit that those
who break the law aim to gain is the success of their protests in effecting the change
whether by direct response from the governing authority or indirectly by inducing more
citizens to participate, thus increasing the possibility of political change. 93
The main question then is to determine the deterrent effect of punishment on
preventing protests in the long run, and whether the pain of the punishment will likely
continue to create enough fear that outweighs the benefit of demanding political
change. Such calculation depends on many variables for each person who contributes
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to the protest; however, the common element which any of them will include in his/her
assessment is the available alternatives for demanding change other than protests.
The rational calculation suggests that the more alternative channels there are
for demanding change and signaling dissatisfaction with the government, the more the
pain of punishment will prevail over the benefit of protesting. As change can be
achieved in other ways without incurring the pain of punishment, then the deterrent
effect of punishing protests will likely be sustained in the long run.
However, when the available channels for effecting change are very limited,
leaving no other alternatives for the people, then a range of possible calculations are
created. One group of people may be dissatisfied but will still fear the consequences of
protesting represented in punishment; a second group will be dissatisfied and will
consider taking the risk of punishment, but will not initiate the protests, and there will
be a third group who will be dissatisfied enough to initiate protests despite the threat of
punishment, which will be seen by them as the price for a greater cause. Once the third
group takes the initiative, it will be a matter of time before the other groups contribute
in expressing their long dissatisfaction. 94
By application on the Egyptian case, the regime uses punishment as a means of
repression to control change in the public realm as analyzed in the first chapter.
Alternative channels of freedom of expression, freedom of press, and the possibility of
political opposition are all being limited. Thus raising the chance that in the long run,
the threat of punishment will not continue to generate enough fear to overcome people's
need to signal dissatisfaction and demand change.
A clear example that illustrates the beginning of the failure of the threat of
punishment to deter Egyptians from protesting is the recent protests on April 15, 2016
against the demarcation of borders between Egypt and Saudi Arabia concerning the
islands of Tiran and Sanafir. 95 The Egyptian president, El-Sisi issued a presidential
decree providing that the two islands are within the borders of Saudi Arabia, without
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first initiating any public discussion around the negotiations, without prior recourse to
the parliament (whose representation of the people is already contested as clarified in
the first chapter), and without conducting a general referendum as requested by the
constitution. 96 Accordingly, despite the threat of punishment to those who would
protest, 97 and because people had no alternative channels to signal their dissatisfaction,
thousands of Egyptians participated in protests against the regime in several
governorates. 98
Thus in assessing the pain of punishment versus the benefit of protesting in the
long run, rational calculation suggests that even if the threat of punishment seems to be
working in the short run in deterring protests, it will fail to sustain such deterrence over
the long run due to the lack of alternative channels for demanding change. Signs of
failure have started to appear in the recent anti-regime protests in April 2016.
Secondly, the next problem facing the regime is that of the civil society
organizations. The Egyptian regime is possibly aiming to deter civil society
organizations’ members and leaders from engaging in any dissenting activities through
their work in the organizations. Such deterrence is working through the threat of
punishment in a wide range of crimes that include accusations of receiving foreign fund
for the purpose of harming the national interest, 99 and accusations of committing crimes
against the government as included in the penal code. 100
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In assessing whether or not the pain of punishment is likely continue to act as a
credible threat that outweighs the benefit of the crime, there must be first an analysis
of the scope of these crimes and the nature of the benefit that the possible offenders
could gain.
Starting from article 78 of the penal code, known as the foreign fund article, we
find that after the current regime amendments in 2014, the crime is no longer about
foreign funds only. The article has been amended to punish the members of the
organizations who engage in a range of activities, including:
request, accept or receive, from a foreign country … or a natural or
legal person, or a foreign or local organization or any other entity
which does not pertain to a foreign country … fund, or equipment,
or tools, or arms … or any other thing for the purpose of harming
the national interest, the unity of the country … or disturbing public
peace and security …will be punished by life time imprisonment. 101
Accordingly, the crime scope has extended to criminalize and punish receiving
not only funds from any entity whatsoever, but as well as requesting, accepting or
receiving “any other thing” as per the wording of the article. Thus, this crime
realistically provides a threat of punishment against all possible means or sources of
funding available to a civil society organization. It also carries a threat of punishment
for any exchange of papers, reports or any sort of communication that falls under the
“any other thing” scope. And the criminal nature of these acts depends on the exclusive
interpretation of what the national interest is as the regime may see.
Furthermore, the other crimes which threaten the civil society members and
leaders with punishment are the crimes against the government included in the second
book of the penal code. These crimes include establishing organizations for the purpose
of “harming national unity or social peace,” 102 or for the purpose of the demolition of
“essential economic and social structures of the state,” 103 or calling for the overthrow
of the regime and inciting change of the basic constitutional principles and economic
or social structures by force. 104
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The preceding analysis of the crimes threatening the members and leaders of
civil society organizations show how wide the sphere of criminalization and
punishment is. These crimes can be interpreted to apply to any type of work done by
the organizations as the regime monopolizes the determination of the national interest
and the meaning of public peace and social and economic structures to accuse any
person of violating and destroying them.
Accordingly, as the crimes possibly extend to cover any work performed by the
members and leaders of the civil society organizations, then the question of the benefit
of the crime becomes a question of the benefit of the civil society organization. What
then are the benefits that civil society organizations aim to achieve?
Generally speaking, civil society organizations play an integral role in
promoting transparency and accountability of governments. They do so by providing
information to different stakeholders in the society, demanding government
accountability, and encouraging formal and informal oversight actors to demand
government accountability. 105
More specifically, an overview of major Egyptian civil society organizations’
objectives clarifies how each aims to achieve such a monitoring and accountability
demanding role in different domains. Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
specifies its objective as promoting “respect for the principles of human rights and
democracy in the Arab region” 106 through developing and promoting policy and
practice changes as well as conducting research on human rights conditions in the Arab
region. 107 Al Nadeem Center provides rehabilitation and assistance for torture victims
and women subject to violence, as well as “campaigning and mobilizing of different
societal sectors” 108 against these practices and publishing reports on torture taking
place in Egyptian police stations. 109 Nazra for Feminist Studies aims to promote
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women’s participation in the public realm with emphasize on the importance of a
democratic environment of equality in rights and duties. 110
Accordingly, we can conclude that what drives the Egyptian civil society
organizations to continue their work despite the threat of punishment 111 is their aim to
achieve the benefit of promoting and demanding government accountability and
pushing for political change towards more democratic governance.
Thus, in the short-run rational calculation between the threat of punishment of
up to life time imprisonment and the benefit of continuing their work, there are three
possible scenarios of calculations. The first scenario concerns those who are not
members of the civil society organizations but want to work in this field; a great
percentage of them will probably be deterred by the threat of punishment and will
refrain from participating. The second scenario concerns the actual members of the
organizations. We can assume that some of them are deterred by the fear of punishment
and some will be committed enough to continue despite the threat of punishment. The
third scenario concerns the leaders of the civil society organizations who will probably
continue their struggle for the survival of their organizations despite the threat of
punishment. 112
Accordingly, in the short run, the deterrence of civil society members seems to
be partially working in deterring some of the targeted individuals. However, what is
the future of such deterrence? Will it achieve complete deterrence or will it fail? Will
the pain of punishment generate enough fear to overcome civil society efforts to
demand accountability and political change in the long run? Will it deter current and
future members and leaders from continuing their struggle?
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In fact, this calculation does not seem to be working on the side of the state. To
clarify, individuals working in or aiming to work in civil society organizations –
especially in such an environment of threats- most probably have interest in and
knowledge of the political situation and the authoritarian practices of the regime. Such
knowledge generates awareness of the importance of political change towards more
equality, democracy and the eradication of human rights violations. This awareness
cannot be taken away by the threat of punishment; it can be coerced into hiding, but
never erased. Its reemergence may be delayed by intimidating people not to work with
civil society organizations and intimidating those who are working with them to stop,
but the demands of change will likely grow in the long run.
In the absence of alternative means for channeling these demands, and the
continuation of authoritarian governance, even if the state manages to deter civil society
organizations by using the threat of punishment, it will not be able to shut down
people’s awareness and demands for change. These demands will probably return back
to the state in different forms. It can explode back to the state in the form of protests as
highlighted above. Individuals may continue the same civil society work of providing
information to the society and demanding transparency and accountability but in an
unorganized shape that the regime will not be able to coerce as an entity, especially
with the existence and spread of social media. Or it may return to a more dangerous
form of turning those individuals to armed struggle against the regime as a result of the
regime’s coercion.
Furthermore, it is not only the calculation of pain and benefit that will not work
to the side of the state in the long run, but one of Bentham’s constraints applies here as
well. Punishment is unprofitable, not only in its failure to augment the overall happiness
of the society who will be deprived of one of its monitoring eyes, but it is equally
unprofitable for the regime itself. The application of punishment so widely and
generally on almost all civil society organizations working in the domain of political
accountability and change 113 will make civil society members fiercer in their struggle
against the government, and thus augmenting political instability. In addition, it will
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likely increase international pressures on the state concerning the status of human rights
and the path towards democracy. 114
Thus, the punishment applied by the regime against the protesters and the civil
society members is not philosophically justified in terms of achieving deterrence in the
long run. The calculation of the prevalence of the pain of the punishment over the
benefit of the crimes does not seem to be working on the side of the state. Then, is
punishment justified in terms of deterring Muslim Brotherhood members? The
assessment of such deterrence triggers an important preliminary question to ask, which
is: deterring them from doing what?
The answer to this question lies in exploring the crimes that threaten the Muslim
Brotherhood members with punishment. In this regard, the Cabinet decree No 579/2014
declaring the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, specifies that whoever
performs any of the following activities will be punished with the legal punishment
provided for the crimes of terrorism: 115
- Whoever contributes in the activities of the organization or
promotes the organization in saying, writing or in any other way and
whoever finances their operations.
- Whoever joins the organization or remains a member of the
organization after the issuance of this decree. 116
Accordingly, the current Egyptian regime is not only trying to deter the Muslim
Brotherhood members from challenging the legitimacy of the regime or from political
opposition and dissent. Rather, it is trying to deter the Brotherhood as an organization
from ever existing, especially as a political actor. The question then is what these
crimes mean for the members of the Brotherhood? What is the benefit that they acquire
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as a result of continuing to be members of the organization, promoting its activities and
fighting for its survival?
The Brotherhood was established in 1928 by Hassan El Banna as a socioreligious movement calling for the application of Islamic Shariaa’. Over the years, it
has developed into a main political actor in the Egyptian political scene promoting a
political agenda based on Islamic principles, and its eventual aim remained the
implementation of Islamic Shariaa’. 117
Accordingly, for the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the membership of
the Brotherhood represents their collective belief in the necessity of the application of
Islamic Shariaa’ in the governance of the state. The existence of the Brotherhood is the
existence of a possible means for the actualization of this belief. Will the pain of
punishment then be able to override such a belief? Will it be able to prevail over the
benefit of having a means for the actualization of this belief?
The lessons of the past answers negatively. In Nasser’s time, the Muslim
Brotherhood suffered from very harsh repression. Their headquarters were destroyed;
their leaders and members were trialed, some of them were hanged and the rest received
long imprisonment sentences in isolated camps where they were subjected to torture
and deprived of basic necessities. 118
However, such severe pain of punishment did not prevail over the members’
belief in the Brotherhood, nor it prevailed over their willingness to struggle for its
survival. Rather, the harsh repression was a direct cause of the emergence of a more
radical ideology within the Brotherhood who advocated that “any regime that could
inflict such enormous suffering was irredeemably corrupt and could only be combated
through force of arms.” 119 The pain of the punishment thus did not deter their struggle
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for the survival of the Brotherhood; rather, it triggered a more dangerous form of
struggle, an armed one.
On application on the current Egyptian regime situation, a recent report
provides that Muslim Brotherhood repression under the current regime is harsher than
their repression in Nasser’s time. 120 Accordingly, the members of the Brotherhood who
are punished and those who are threatened with punishment will likely see that they are
going through a new repression phase similar to the one that their predecessors
underwent during Nasser’s time. Their rational calculation will probably see the pain
of the punishment as a cost they pay for their fight for survival.
This is correlated in reports that indicate that most of the young members of the
Brotherhood advocate for the necessity of revenge and the use of violence against the
regime’s repression. 121 Thus, punishment is again creating a similar outcome to the
radical ideology created by punishment in Nasser’s time.
Furthermore, not only the pain of punishment will probably fail to outweigh
these individuals struggle for the survival of the Brotherhood. Rather, punishment is
unprofitable as well according to Bentham’s constraints.
An overview of the history of the Brotherhood shows that their development
away from the radical ideology of violence and towards a more reformist approach of
their Islamic ideology -to be more open to inclusive democracy- has been associated
with the times in which they were allowed to politically participate. Such development
of course has taken long years, however it has always been impeded during times of
repression. In times of repression and severe punishment, more radical conservative
ideas emerged in attempts to survive. As Wickham, Carrie Rosefsky, puts it
The influence of the reformist faction waxed and waned with the
fortunes of the Brotherhood. In times of political opening, the
reformist impulse gained traction, but in times of repression, it lost
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its resonance as the focus of the group shifted to surviving under
siege. 122
Accordingly, in terms of the utility principle objective of augmenting happiness, the
punishment applied by the Egyptian regime against the Brotherhood increases future
political instability, increases the probability of violence and terrorism and as a
consequence minimizes society’s happiness.
Consequently, based on the previous analysis, the punishment used by the
Egyptian regime cannot be philosophically justified on the basis of deterrence. In fact,
the punishment adopted by the Egyptian regime mixed with the very wide
criminalization sphere pushes punishment to be weighed against a survival struggle for
the alleged offenders in the absence of legitimate channels through which they can
achieve their aims.
3. Moral Reform Theory:
As noted above, consequentialists and utilitarians share the view that punishment is
only justified as long as it promotes good consequences and augments the overall
happiness of the society. As well, both agree that one of the primary aims which can
be qualified as a good consequence and a greater happiness is the prevention of the
crime. Such prevention however, is not only achieved by deterrence through fear of
punishment. Rather, some of them advocate that this goal can be better achieved
through reforming the criminal him/herself to becoming a better person who sees the
committed crime as a wrongful conduct that should not be repeated.
Bentham actually acknowledged that reforming the criminal is one of the ways
in which happiness can be augmented and crimes prevented. 123 But it was not until
later, that reform started to emerge as a strong competitor in justifying punishment
against deterrence and retributivism. 124
Some theorists advocate that moral reform is one of the secondary aims of
punishment in addition to the main aim of deterrence or retributivism in preventing
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crimes. While others like Morris and Hampton suggest that it should be the main
justifying aim of punishment. 125 More specifically, Hampton advocates that:
[I]t is incorrect to regard simple deterrence as the aim of
punishment; rather, to state it succinctly, the view maintains that
punishment is justified as a way to prevent wrongdoing insofar as it
can teach both wrongdoers and the public at large the moral reasons
for choosing not to perform an offense. 126
In fact, moral reform particularly is distinguished from the rehabilitation aim of
punishment in that it stresses the importance of respecting offenders’ autonomy.
Rehabilitation theorists see criminal behavior as an illness that punishment cures, even
if against the will of the offender. Moral reform theorists, on the other hand, see
punishment’s role is to convince the criminal that his/her actions are morally wrong
and to induce them not to do it again because not committing a crime is the right thing
to do. 127 In this regard, some of the most important theorists who gave considerable
exploration of the idea of morally reforming criminals are Herbert Morris, Jean
Hampton and R. A. Duff. 128
Morris and Hampton both advocate for a paternalistic view in which they made
a similarity between parents who punish their children to benefit them into being better
persons and the state who should deal with criminals in the same way. 129 Accordingly,
in such case, the state’s aim should not be to treat its citizens like animals who will be
deterred by fear of punishment, but – in Hampton view especially – to educate them
that what they did is morally wrong. 130
As to Duff, he concentrated more on the communication element. He
advocated that punishment has a communication role according to which punishment
should persuade offenders to regret their wrongdoing and to induce them to selfreform. 131
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What is common about the meaning of reform amongst these theorists is that
“the psychological changes in offenders that they are interested in promoting are,
roughly …: becoming convinced that one’s action was wrong; feeling guilty for
performing it; resolving not to do it again.” 132
Such a view of punishment, whether as a moral educative or communicative
lesson to the offender, is underlined by two main assumptions. The first one is that the
state has a superior status to the individuals as a neutral institution intending their
benefit. Secondly, the state is making moral declarations through the law about the
rightfulness and the wrongfulness of the individuals’ actions.
In the first assumption, although the superior status of the state in applying
punishment is inherent in all punishment theories to a certain degree, however, it gains
an additional importance here. Here, the state exceeds its superior status of a regulator
who ensures that breaking the law will have consequences to being a moral educator
who aims to communicate to the offender the immorality of his/her actions for his/her
own benefit. It is a picture of a state that cares for the individuals and who is above
individuals’ conflict. This is especially clear in Morris and Hampton views, in which
the state plays a role similar to a parent who punishes his children to morally educate
them about right and wrong. As Hampton advocates “punishment should not be
justified as a deserved evil, but rather as an attempt, by someone who cares, to improve
a wayward person.” 133 As to the second assumption, it does not assume that the state
should declare a set of moral laws, but rather that the existing laws themselves make
moral declarations regarding the criminalized conducts. 134
Accordingly, assuming that the Egyptian regime's philosophy of punishment is
not deterrence at all or not deterrence only, but to teach those criminals that their acts
are morally wrong, to make them admit guilty for them and to reform them into
refraining from committing crimes in the future because it is the right thing to do on
moral grounds. Then, the success of such an aim depends on the realization of the
previous two assumptions. First, whether the state is seen by the offenders as a neutral
punishment institution aiming at the offenders’ benefit. Second, determining the nature
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of the moral messages that the Egyptian regime is declaring through its laws and
whether it is consistent with the crimes.
Based on the answers to these questions, we would be able to see whether there
are logical reasons to support whether a reform policy will achieve its aim. Will the
Egyptian regime be able to convince the offenders that their actions are morally wrong?
Will reform work as a successful justification for the regime in using punishment?
4. Application of Moral Reform Philosophy on the Egyptian Regime:
According to the moral reform philosophy, the first step towards moral reform is
convincing the offender that his/her actions are morally wrong. Without the realization
of the first step, the state cannot move to the second or the third steps represented in
initiating a feeling of guilt and a willingness to not commit a crime based on moral
grounds.
Accordingly, as highlighted above, in order to educate or communicate such a
message of morality, the educator/communicator should be an institution intending the
benefit of the offender through conviction, and the offender’s actions should be
declared immoral by the laws of the state. In our case, neither assumption is realized.
To clarify, the use of punishment as a repression mechanism -as explained in
the first chapter- as much as it may produce benefits for the regime, it as well hurts and
diminishes its legitimacy in the eyes of the prosecuted. The regime’s acts of repression
and restriction of freedoms, created a picture of the state not as an impartial party who
is responsible for the administration of punishment and the reform of criminals, but,
rather as an enemy who coerces those who object the regime.
Furthermore, the persuasion process that the state should be aiming to achieve
to reform the offenders who broke the law, the regime is unable to conduct it with those
who are law abiding citizens. The control of the means of change in the public realm
regarding the simplest forms of communication and conviction represented in the
power of the word, 135 means that the regime is unable to face public dissent with

135

See Ch.1 of this paper, at 15-16

39

discussions and conviction. Rather, it chooses to repress those who oppose and dissent
instead of hearing, replying and, convincing.
Moreover, even if state supporters argue otherwise that the regime is fair and
that punishment institutions are impartial. The importance of the picture of the state in
the reform process is not in how the state sees itself; rather, it is in how the offenders
see the state. It is them who we need to convince of the immorality of their actions, not
the supporters who already are convinced and satisfied with the regime’s actions. Thus,
the picture of the state that cares for the benefit of its citizens is missing completely.
As to the second assumption of the declaration of the immorality of the
criminalized conducts, it is more complex. This assumption rests on the idea that the
existing laws are communicating certain moral commands to the offenders and that
through the reform process, the state aims to return the offenders to the moral grounds
declared by the law. However, the problem with the crimes under which protesters, and
civil society members are punished, is that the wide criminalization sphere declares
ambiguous messages that contradict with other moral commands declared by a higher
legal instrument, which is the constitution.
Let’s consider first, the problem of protesters. The constitution declares a clear
moral message that “Citizens have the right to organize public meetings, processions
and demonstrations, and all forms of peaceful protests, provided they do not carry
weapons of any type, and upon notification as regulated by the law.” 136 The protests
law provides in its first article that “[c]itizens have the right to organize and join public
meetings, processions and peaceful protests, according to the provisions and the
limitations set by this law.” 137
Indeed, there is no absolute right; every right declared by the constitution is to
be regulated within certain limits by the laws. However, a limitation means that the
exercise of the right is going to be restricted with clear boundaries, not effectively
prevented.
With application to the right to protest, protesting means that citizens have the
right to object to the current order by peacefully demonstrating against it. However,
136
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what the protest law did is that it criminalized the conduct of protesting against the
public order 138 without specifying what public order means. Thus, the law created a
wide discretionary power that possibly equates violating public order with any dissent
activity against the current regime. 139 Accordingly, as the law made the crime
applicable on any protest of dissent, and as every protest is an act of dissent 140then the
law has not restricted protests, it prevented them altogether.
How the regime –then - will be able to communicate a moral message that the
right to protest, to object, is immoral as a crime, while the constitution drafted by the
regime itself declares it as a basic constitutional right?
Thus, when the state attempts to reform the punished protesters by educating
them that their actions were morally wrong, all what the punished offenders will hear
is that the state is saying protest is morally wrong and this cannot be true according to
the moral commands of the higher legal instrument, the constitution.
The same problem faces the regime regarding the members of civil society
organizations. Article 75 of the constitution details the right to freely establishing and
operating a civil society organization:
Citizens have the right to establish associations and nongovernmental organizations on a democratic basis, and these shall
be deemed legal entities upon notification.
Such institutions shall operate freely, and administrative authorities
may not intervene in their affairs, nor dissolve them or their board
of directors or trustees without a court order. 141
Accordingly, the constitution declares a moral message that organizations have
the right to operate freely on a democratic basis. Such operation refers to the ability of
the organizations to achieve their declared objectives. Civil society organizations’
Id. at article 7
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objectives generally revolve around promoting transparency through providing
information to different stakeholders in the society, demanding government
accountability, and pushing for political change towards more democratic governance.
These objectives require the ability of the organizations to contest the
usefulness and conformity of the government actions with what they believe to be the
national interest of the country. Thus, when the government monopolizes the
determination of the national interest and punishes whoever disagrees, then this
constitutional freedom becomes meaningless.
As clarified above in the deterrence context, crimes threatening civil society
members can be factually applied to any work done by the organizations under the
notions of violating national interest, destabilizing general peace and, demolition of the
essential social or economic structures of the state. 142 Accordingly, the crimes under
which civil society members are being punished sends moral messages that contradicts
with the essence of the higher moral message of freedom of operation provided by the
constitution.
Thus, if a civil society member is accused of any of these flexible crimes gets
convicted and punished. How will the state succeed in convincing him/her that the
organization’s work is against the national interest when there is a fundamental
objection on the part of the punished individual to the monopolization of the regime to
the determination of what the national interest is?
How the state will be able to convince a feminist organization member working
on changes to the social male dominated culture to call for more empowerment of
women that her work is morally wrong because it demolishes the basic social structures
and that she should be punished for it?
Similarly, a civil society member who issues reports on the violations and
torture practices of the Ministry of Interior, how will the regime be able to convince
him/her that he/she should be punished for inciting the hatred and the disrespect for the
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government, thus inciting the overthrow of the government 143 and that this is morally
wrong?
Accordingly, the moral reform process of the protesters or the civil society
organizations members is likely to fail due to the unreasonableness of the moral
messages of the crimes and their contradiction with the higher moral messages declared
by the constitution.
The last problem, which is the reform of the Muslim Brotherhood members is
more complicated than the previous two. Unlike the protesters and the civil society
organizations members, the Muslim Brotherhood members will not see that there is a
contradiction in the moral messages declared by the laws of the state. Rather, they deny
the ability of the laws of the state to issue any moral commands in the first place.
To clarify, the Muslim Brotherhood's main purpose and ideology is that the only
applicable law is the Islamic Shariaa’ and not the man-made laws of the state. 144
Accordingly, the only legitimate source for the issuance of moral commands, according
to their ideology is the Islamic Shariaa’.
Consequently, when the state issues a law that criminalizes membership of the
Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, which is the main vehicle demanding the
application of the Islamic Shariaa’ in the governance of the state. Then, the punished
members will conceive such a message not only as an immoral one, but also as a
message of refusal to those who promote the Islamic Shariaa’, moreover, in some
extremists’ views, as a message of refusal to Islam itself.
Thus, a reform process that aims to bring Muslim Brotherhood members to the
moral grounds of the laws of the state will likely fail due to the fundamental
contradiction on the nature and source of the moral grounds that govern these
individuals’ conduct.
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Moreover, even if the regime attempted to educate them religiously that there
is no contradiction between the ability of the state to issue moral commands in its laws
and Islamic Shariaa’, such reform is likely to fail. This is because the communication
of morality is coming not only from the state as an enemy who coerces the individuals
as explained earlier, but, more particularly, from the illegitimate authority – in the
Brotherhood members view- who performed a coup against the man who could have
applied Islamic Shariaa’. Thus, this creates an impediment against the regime’s ability
to issue or communicate moral or legitimate commands.
Accordingly, the Egyptian regime's use of punishment cannot be justified in
terms of achieving moral reform. This is due to the lack of the state's ability to convince
the offenders of the immorality of their actions due to its stance as an enemy in conflict
with them, and not as an institution that is above the conflict for which they are being
punished. This is in addition to the contradiction of the moral messages declared by the
crimes for which the offenders are being punished, and the moral messaged declared
by their basic rights in the constitution.

B. Retributivism
Retributivism is the opposing school of thought to consequentialism in the justification
of punishment. For retributivists, the justification for punishment does not lie in some
good consequences that it achieves, or the social welfare that it produces for the benefit
of the greater good of some of people. 145 Rather, punishment is an end in itself;
criminals should be punished because punishment is the just and fair response to the
crime that they committed. 146 Punishment, in itself, is a goal as it produces justice by
giving every criminal the punishment he/she deserves.
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1. Retributivism Theory
Originally, retributivism started in the thinking of Immanuel Kant who
advocated for the principle of retribution, providing that:
What kind and what degree of punishment does public legal justice
adopt as its principle and standard? None other than the principle of
equality (illustrated by the pointer on the scales of justice), that is,
the principle of not treating one side more favorably than the other.
Accordingly, any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else
among the people is one that you do to yourself. If you vilify him,
you vilify yourself; if you steal from him, you steal from yourself.
Only the Law of Retribution (jus talionis) can determine exactly the
kind and degree of punishment. 147
This principle constitutes the basic element in retributivists’ thought, which has
evolved in different forms over the years. One of the earlier forms is the ‘just deserts’
interpretation, which advocates that the justification of punishment is embedded in the
punishment’s role in achieving justice though giving every criminal a degree of harm
that is proportionate and just in response to their wrongdoing and the degree of their
culpability. 148
Other forms include justifying punishment in terms of satisfying punitive
emotions. This interpretation advocates that punishment is an end in itself because by
giving the criminal what he/she deserves, the public’s feelings of vengeance and hatred
are satisfied in a legal organized manner. 149 Others have interpreted punishment as a
way of expressing the state’s disapproval to the violation that the criminal committed,
and such expression should be proportionate to the seriousness of the violation. 150
Accordingly, it seems that all of these interpretations share common features
which underlie retributivists thinking. First, punishment is justified as a response to a
past crime, not as a tool to prevent future crimes. Second, that there is a vital connection
between the validity of punishment and the wrongfulness of the act punished. Such
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connection requires that for justice to be achieved that the act punished should be
qualified as a wrongdoing in the first place. And second that the degree and severity of
punishment should be proportionate to the wrongdoing in a way that ensures that
punishment is just what the criminal deserves. 151
This clearly incites asking, if punishment is only justified when it gives the
criminal the just degree deserved for his wrongdoing, how to judge then when the
punishment has given the criminal more or less than what he deserves? In other words,
what exactly constitutes the just degree intended?
In response to these questions, the unfair advantage theory emerged as one of
the most important interpretations of the retributivism thought by Herbert Morris. 152
Morris’s theory assumes that society is composed of individuals who agreed to live
together under a group of rules which serves to protect each individual’s rights, liberties
and bodily safety. 153 Under these rules, each individual enjoys equal benefits and
burdens. These benefits are presented in each person’s ability to have their own sphere
where no one interferes with his/her liberties and safety. The burdens are presented in
each person’s omission to interfere with the sphere of other people by harming their
liberties or safety. Accordingly, “If a person fails to exercise self-restraint even though
he might have and given in to such inclinations, he renounces a burden which others
have voluntarily assumed and thus gains an advantage which others, who have
restrained themselves, do not possess.” 154
Accordingly, punishment constitutes just what the criminal deserves when it
places an extra burden on the criminal that equates the burden that he escaped, with an
aim of restoring the balance of benefits and burdens. Thus, punishment interferes as the
appropriate means to restore the balance by removing the unfair advantage that the
criminal has acquired for himself by committing the crime and freeing himself from
the restrictions of the law. 155
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Consequently, in order to justify punishment based on retributivism, there are
two main assumptions that must be realized. The first of them and the common one
amongst all versions of retributivism is the wrongfulness of the conduct for which the
offender is being punished. As punishment is only deserved as just deserts for the
offender’s wrongful conduct, then if such wrongfulness is negated, the applied
punishment cannot be justified.
The second assumption relates to the interpretation of Morris regarding the
justification of the degree of punishment deserved by the offender. He provides that the
burden of punishment should equate the unfair advantage that the offender acquired by
the crime in a society of balanced distribution of burdens and benefits. Accordingly,
there is a basic assumption of the existence of a balanced distribution of rights and
obligations among the members of the society, and the lack of such balance leads to
the failure of the punishment justification as a result. 156
Thus, if we assume that the Egyptian regime's philosophy of punishment is to
achieve justice by giving every offender the punishment he/she deserves, then, there
are two main questions to address: first, whether the actions that the offenders are being
punished for are wrongful. Second, whether the offenders acquired an unfair advantage
in a balanced society of burdens and benefits.
2. Application of Retributivism Philosophy on the Egyptian Regime
The first and foremost question to ask, is whether the acts for which protesters,
civil society organizations members and Muslim Brotherhood members are being
punished for, are wrong?
The wrongfulness of any action is generally contested. There is no objective
truth in deciding whether a specific action is right or wrong. Those opposing the regime
will certainly provide that these actions are not wrong and, that the regime is abusing
the mechanism of punishment. While, supporters of the regime will advocate that these
actions are wrongful by nature. How then can such a conflict be resolved in deciding
the wrongfulness of the actions embodied in the crimes of protesting, the crimes against
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the government and the crimes of pertaining to the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist
organization?
I believe, such a conflict can be resolved by returning to the document made by
the regime and its supporters, and campaigned as being the protector of national
interests, 157 it is the constitution. The regime strongly urged people to vote for its
adoption as a patriotic duty, and as a sign of support to El-Sisi. 158
The previous section shows how the analysis of the crimes of protesting against
public order and the crimes threatening civil society organizations members are
actually crimes against protesting and against the free operation of the organizations.
Thus, these crimes contradict with the moral commands of the constitution, which
identified these acts as being morally right.
On the other hand, with regard to the Muslim Brotherhood members, they are
punished for membership of the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, and for
promoting its activities and contributing to its operations. Are these actions wrong?
The wrongfulness of the membership and the acts of promotion and
contribution is derived from the characterization of the Brotherhood as a terrorist
organization. In this regard, the acts of terror and violence are defined as wrong by
most people, however, is the regime punishing acts of terror and violence? Is it giving
just deserts for offenders who have harmed people with their actions of terrorism?
In fact, it is hard to answer affirmatively to this question because the crime is
the mere membership or contribution to without requiring any additional act of
violence. Furthermore, those who will be punished for being members or continuing to
be members or contributing to the activities of the Brotherhood as a terrorist
organization can also be characterized as being members and contributors to the acts
of a former political party, whom the regime characterized as being terroristic after its
overthrow from governance.

Cabinet: Most voters plan to approve constitution, Mada Masr (Dec. 2013), available at
http://www.madamasr.com/news/cabinet-most-voters-plan-approve-constitution
158
Sisi’s Egypt, Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa (Dec. 2015 – Feb. 2016), available at
https://chronicle.fanack.com/egypt/history-past-to-present/sisi-egypt/
157

48

Then, is the characterization of terrorism by the regime enough to turn the
membership and the contribution into a wrongful conduct and to deserve punishment
for it according to the retributivism philosophy?
Returning to the original words of Kant on retribution in search for answers, we
find that he said “any undeserved evil that you inflict on someone else among the
people is one that you do to yourself. If you vilify him, you vilify yourself; if you steal
from him, you steal from yourself.” 159
Apparently, Kant is referring to a wrongful conduct that causes an underserved
evil i.e. that causes harm. Does membership qualify as harm? In the eyes of the regime,
it may qualify as the harm of strengthening the organization which promotes political
ideas that they object to, or believe to be dangerous. But, isn’t the freedom to be a
supporter of political ideas -even if in opposition to the current government policiespart of the right of political participation? Otherwise, how can it be in a democratic
republic as the first article of the constitution stipulates? 160
This analysis leaves us with one of two conclusions. Either we can depend on
the declared intentions of the regime in the constitution, which they advocated to be
the protector of the national interests 161and consequently reach the conclusion that the
crimes of protesting, civil society and Muslim Brotherhood contradict with the
constitutional rights and their intrinsic moral goodness. Or, we admit that this
constitution is just ink on paper, and thus the punishment applied is a political, and not
legal. In both cases, it is hard to justify such punishment on the basis of retributivism.
As to the second question, whether this punishment can be justified as a
restoration of balance between benefits and burdens in the society. A useful start to
answer can be from the general criticism against the unfair advantage theory that “the
view of political society it presupposes is so unrealistic as to render the theory
altogether inapplicable.” 162 In fact, it is hard to argue that in any society, there is a
balanced distribution of benefits and burdens. The law that places benefits and burdens
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between individuals is realistically made by people who have enough power and money
to reach the stage of putting the rules of the game, and they one way or another, put it
as to best serve their interests. The impoverished and the unprivileged, even in the most
democratic societies have much smaller contribution to the creation of the rules to their
favor.
Accordingly, the related idea in the theory that the criminal is punished because
he “failed to 'play by the rules'” 163 to which he agreed is highly contested, especially
in the Egyptian case. The rules of the game are the product of the regime’s will alone;
the punished individuals did not agree to play by them.
The constitution was amended by members appointed by the interim president
Adly Mansour. 164 The protest law was issued by the interim president Adly Mansour,
against the objection of almost all youth movements and civil society organizations. 165
The crimes against the government have been included in the penal code since 1937
during the days of the royal family, and the new amendments such as the one of the
foreign fund article were introduced by a presidential decree that has the force of law
under president El-Sisi. 166 The declaration of the Brotherhood to be a terrorist
organization was issued by a Cabinet decree. 167
Accordingly, it is not being even argued that people representatives do not
really reflect the opinions of the impoverished or the interests of the opposing voices
to the regime. Rather, the laws under which the offenders are being punished are the
sole product of the regime directly. Thus, there was no agreement to these rules of the
game, nor there were any balanced distribution of burdens and benefits under them.
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Not only that, but moreover, even if we assumed that this constitution grants
every individual an equal sphere of rights and obligations, infringement of which leads
to punishment. We find that the offenders did not infringe others’ spheres; rather the
regime has infringed on their rights by using flexible criminalization boundaries and
placed an unfair burden on the individuals addressed by these crimes in the first place.
And by punishing them, not only is no balance restored, but rather a greater imbalance
and injustice is created by placing an additional burden of punishment on those who
already are under an unfair burden.
Accordingly, the state is neither achieving justice nor restoring balance by
punishing offenders under these crimes. Rather, it is placing a double unfair burden on
the punished offenders. The first burden is the manipulation of the rules that the regime
advocates to be the rules of the game, and the second is the burden of being punished
for exercising these rights.
Based on this analysis, it is highly unlikely that the regime will be able to justify
its use of punishment on the basis of achieving justice through retributivism.

C. Political Control
Criminal punishment enforced by the state is a form of violence and coercion against
the offender. They capture a person against his will; lock him in a cell, deprive him of
his freedom for years, his whole life stops and his world turns into a chamber of four
walls. Or, moreover, they may even take away his life through capital punishment. 168
However, one of the most important reasons why punishment institutions
continue to endure in states is the belief that there is a justification that turns such a
practice from pure violence into legitimate violence, legitimate coercion. Whether for
a greater aim of promoting the greater good of the society, or for reforming the captured
criminal, or for justice requirement to give every culpable wrongdoer his/her just
deserts. As Dolinko highlights the importance of the justification of criminal
punishment:
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Criminal Punishment involves the infliction on the offender of
deprivations, restrictions, and disabilities whose imposition would
in other contexts be morally improper and illegitimate. The various
competing “theories of punishment” … seek to explain why we are
nonetheless morally permitted, or perhaps even required, to punish
criminals. 169
The previous sections have shown how punishment applied by the regime under
the protest law, the crimes against the government and the criminalization of
membership of the Muslim Brotherhood lack justification. The regime’s punishment
of these offenders, cannot be justified in terms of achieving deterrence, nor is it justified
in terms of morally reforming the offenders, and not even justified in terms of achieving
public justice.
Accordingly, we are left with naked unjustified violence. This strongly
provokes asking, what may be then the intention of the state from using this form of
violence? What does the state aim to achieve in the long run, if not, deterrence, reform,
or justice?
The only possible answer left, and which actually fits the current nondemocratic nature of governance, is that the regime is trying to achieve political control
of the public realm to achieve a certain degree of stability which will guarantee the
durability of the regime.
Eventually, such an aim appears to have succeeded in the short run. Protests –
at least prior to April 2016- were eliminated. Civil society organizations are currently
working in a very restrictive environment, some have been closed and others threatened
with closure. Political opposition and the media self-censor out of fear of punishment,
and the problem of the Muslim Brotherhood's challenge to legitimacy is contained by
imprisoning all its leaders and a great percentage of its members.
Now, the regime possibly aims that such control will be effective enough as to
generate stability, to ensure the durability of the regime and, may be to allow for the
development of the state. Accordingly, we need to ask; will such political control
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endure? Can it generate stability and restrict future dissent over the long run? In short,
can unjustified punishment achieve political control and stability over the long run?
Regarding the questions of the durability of control and its relation to stability
and dissent, political scientists have explored the relationship between coercive
techniques and the durability of regimes through measuring how repression increases
or decreases the likelihood of more dissent against the regime.
Authors begin by defining what is meant by violence or coercion.
Unsurprisingly, illegitimate punishment is one of the first types. 170According to
Conway W. Henderson, coercion definitely includes “arbitrary arrest and detention.” 171
Further, Dipak K. Gupta, Harinder Singh and Tom Sprague provide that coercion
include the application of punishment on dissent groups:
The literature on government coercion…implies three different
aspects of coercion. First, coercion may be overt, that is, the actual
use of governmental authority to inflict punishment on the dissident
groups. Second, it can also manifest in expectations about future
threats of sanctions from the regime. Third, coercion can have covert
or preemptive aspects, such as surveillance and infiltration of the
opposition movement by the forces of the authority. 172
However, the studies conducted on the result of repression on the likelihood of dissent,
and the durability of regimes are controversial in their results. They can generally be
grouped into two trends opposing each other.
The first trend provides that repression can succeed in decreasing the likelihood
of dissent by increasing the costs of political participation and objection. 173 Their
analyses suggest that coercion, at first, triggers high levels of dissent out of anger from
repression up to a certain point. After this point, the costs of dissent become unbearable
as to lead to a replacement of anger with the fear of repression and thus lead to a
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significant decrease in dissent. 174 This means that control will likely endure and
repression will eventually produce enough fear to overcome dissent.
On the other hand, the other group argues the opposite. Repressive techniques
lead to more dissent and reduces the legitimacy of the governing authority. 175 Their
analysis provides that coercive techniques, such as illegitimate punishment in our case,
might decrease dissent in the short run, however, it likely “increases dissident behavior
in the long-run, particularly when repression is applied indiscriminately.” 176
Accordingly, they conclude that the fear generated by repression is only temporary,
and in the long run stability will not endure and more dissent is likely to arise. How
then can one judge which outcome between these two opposing trends is likely to apply
in the case of the Egyptian regime?
The answer may be found in exploring what is exactly at stake here. What is
the element that the regime loses by specifically applying unjustified punishment as a
repression technique? As discussed above, punishment is violence but only legitimate
when it has moral or philosophical justification. Accordingly, what the regime loses
when it loses justification is the legitimacy to use violence.
The more the regime uses unjustified punishment repetitively and
indiscriminately, the more citizens will see that this punishment lacks justification, and
as such is illegitimate. Such loss of legitimacy in the use of state violence in punishment
certainly will eat from the regime’s share of legitimacy in governing. 177 As advocated
by Cherian George explaining and citing Hannah Arendt on the effects of violence on
power:
What power needs is legitimacy, and legitimacy is what is lost when
violence is misapplied: ‘To substitute violence for power can bring
victory, but the price is very high; for it is not only paid by the
vanquished, it is also paid by the victor in terms of his own power. 178
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Apparently, the main loss that the regime will experience from unjustified punishment
is the loss of legitimacy. This clearly incites asking why legitimacy is important, and
what the effects of losing legitimacy are on political control and stability.
Legitimacy generally means “the right to rule and the recognition by the ruled
of that right.” 179 The importance of legitimacy lies in the fact that it is the engine that
generates people's obedience to the authority. It guarantees that citizens will accept the
forms of coercion applied to them by the state, such as imposing taxes and abiding by
the rules. 180
Further, legitimacy ensures stability of the state, better administration of state
policies and better performance overall. 181 More importantly and related to political
control and stability is the fact that “states that lack legitimacy devote more resources
to maintaining their rule and less to effective governance, which reduces support and
makes them vulnerable to overthrow or collapse.” 182
Accordingly, the Egyptian regime needs legitimacy to ensure people peaceful
obedience and lesser dissent. However, the use of unjustified punishment erodes the
regime’s legitimacy, thus lessening the likelihood of peaceful obedience. As long as
peaceful obedience decreases and dissent increases, the regime will need violence to
ensure obedience. The more violence is used, the less legitimacy the regime will have,
and accordingly less peaceful obedience and more violence, and so on.
Consequently, violence used by the regime will open a vicious circle of violence
that may end in the death of the regime itself. That is why political science theorists
advocate that “there are selfish, rational reasons for even dictators to exercise selfrestraint in their use of violence.” 183
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A clear example of the beginning of this cycle is the recent protests in April
2016 on the demarcation of islands Tiran and Sanafir between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
On April 15th 2016, despite the threats of the Ministry of Interior, many protests erupted
in different governorates in opposition to the demarcation of these borders. 184 The
regime had to use the police forces to contain the protests, and many young people
were arrested. 185 The president said that he does not want anyone to talk about this
issue any more. 186 However, despite the arrests, and the regime threats, protesters
advocated that they will protest again in 25th of April, Sinai liberation day. 187 Such
dissenting act against the regime signals that people are starting to break the point of
fear. 188
To face the protests of 25th of April, the regime had to use more violence to
secure obedience. The police forces started a random arrest campaigns of young people
sitting at cafés, searching their mobiles and laptops for any sign of dissent against the
regime. 189 On the 25th of April, the army forces joined police forces in fighting the
protests. Hundreds of protesters were arrested. 190
These incidents trigger great worry about this circle of violence created by the
regime’s attempts to control the public realm through unjustified punishment. This is
the beginning signs of the consequences of losing legitimacy due – at least partially- to
unjustified and illegitimate use of punishment.
Consequently, in answer to the main question about whether unjustified
punishment can generate political control in the long run. I believe based on the
previous analysis that unjustified punishment will likely fail to produce political control
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or stability due to the lack of legitimacy. Such lack of legitimacy will lead to more
violence from the regime to secure obedience, thus increasing political instability and
the likelihood of ongoing dissent and revolt.
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VI. Conclusion:
This paper argues that the Egyptian regime post 30 of June 2013 used punishment as
means of control of the public realm in the short run, however, in the long run, such
use of punishment will likely fail.
The current political context analyzed in the first chapter suggests that now five
years after the Revolution, Egypt is drifting away from democracy towards an
authoritarian form of governance in which punishment is used as means to political
control of the public realm. However, in the long run, such use of punishment will
likely fail because it has no moral or philosophical justification and it will likely fail to
guarantee political control.
Chapter two detailed these arguments by proving that the Egyptian regime use
of punishment in the public realm fails to be justified according to any of the main
theories of punishment whether in terms of consequentialism or retributivism. As a
result, such lack of moral and philosophical justification returns punishment to being
illegitimate. Such illegitimacy will deduct from the regime’s legitimacy to govern, thus
generating more violence to secure obedience and achieving less political stability.
Accordingly, the insistence of the Egyptian regime on using unjustified
punishment as a way of dealing with its political problems is a recipe for failure.
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